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Abstract 
In this paper, we examine the impact of the `1.03 million yen ceiling,' a means-tested transfer scheme for secondary 
earners in Japan, on earnings inequality of married women. We find that the decline in earnings inequality among 
married women between 1993 and 2003 is attributable to the increase in the number of wives with low earnings and 
the decrease in the number of wives with zero earnings.
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     1 Introduction
Incometaxesorothergovernmentpoliciessometimescreatecircumstanceswherein
individual earnings tend to concentrate at certain levels (bunching); Saez (2009)
lists a number of such examples. In this paper, we focus on one such scheme in
Japan: the 1.03 million yen ceiling.
The 1.03 million yen ceiling refers to the tendency that married women in
Japan who work part time set their annual earnings close to 1.03 million yen.
This phenomenon has attracted much attention in the literature (e.g., Nagase &
Nawata (2005); Akabayashi (2006); Sakata & McKenzie (2006); Abe (2009a)).
The concentration around this ceiling is owing to the discontinuities in the budget
set, which are created by the income tax set-up, social security system and fringe
beneﬁt arrangements provided by the husband’s employer.1 In spite of much at-
tention, however, the focus of previous studies has almost exclusively been on
behavioral or eﬃciency aspects of the ceiling: the distributional consequences of
the ceiling are not well known.
In this paper we provide a simple decomposition procedure to understand
how the ceiling aﬀects earnings inequality among married women, and apply it
to Japanese microdata. The novel feature of our procedure is that it explicitly
considers the concentration of married women’s earnings around 1.03 million yen
and measures its quantitative impacts on earnings inequality.
The 1.03 million yen ceiling is most relevant for married women who work
part time. The number of women working under part-time status increased dra-
matically in the past two decades.2 The earnings of those workers are generally
lower than those of regular, full-time workers because (1) hourly wages of part-
time workers are about 30 percent lower than those of full-time workers and (2)
the 1.03 million yen ceiling provides incentives for married women to restrain
their working hours so that their earnings do not exceed the threshold.
Empirical evidence shows that the earnings of married female part-timers are
heavily concentrated slightly below 1.03 million yen (Akabayashi (2006); Abe
(2009a)). Figure 1 illustrates the pattern of concentration from the microdata of
the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (NSFIE).
1See Nagase & Nawata (2005), Akabayashi (2006), and Abe (2009a) for explanation and evi-
dence.
2In fact, in Japan, the increase in labor force participation by women was in the form of part-
time employment, and not of regular full-time employment (Abe (2009b)).
22 Earnings decomposition when the ceiling is present
In this section, we explain the framework for earnings decomposition taking into
account the 1.03 million yen ceiling.
Let ¯ y be the mean earnings for married women, V(y) be their variance andCV2
be the square of the coeﬃcient of variation (CV2 = V(y)/¯ y2).
We denote yi as the earnings of individual (wife) i and θ is the threshold value
around which the earnings are concentrated (i.e., 1.03 million yen). For the pur-
pose of our analysis, wives are classiﬁed into one of the following four categories
depending on their earnings level (notations in parentheses are the labels for each
group): (1) zero earnings (Z), (2) earnings between 0 and θ (I0), (3) earnings equal
to θ (T) and (4) earnings over θ (I1).
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where ¯ y0 is the mean earnings of wives in group I0, and ¯ y1 is the mean earnings of
wives in group I1.
Dividing V(y) in Eq. (1) by ¯ y2 and simplifying yields the following expression































The ﬁrst line of Eq. (2) is the between-group component; it is the sum of the
squared deviations of the group means from the population mean, weighted by the
population share of each group. The second line is the sum of the within-group
variances for the groups I0 and I1. Workers in groups I0 and I1 choose working
3hours as an interior solution.3 For non-workers and those with earnings equal to
θ, earnings are equal for everyone within the group, and thus, the within-group
variance is zero.4
The decomposition of Eq. (2) implies the following: (1) a decrease in the
number of wives with zero earnings (i.e., decrease in nZ/N) reduces CV2 and (2)
CV2 is the sum of six terms, where each term is the product of the population
share and the square of the deviation of the group mean from ¯ y (the within-group
variance). The decomposition of CV2 in Eq. (2) is summarized in Table 1.
3 Empirical analysis
The data used for our empirical analysis is the microdata from the NSFIE5 for the
years 1994 and 2004. The NSFIE is a nationally representative survey in Japan
that collects information on household earnings. We apply the above procedure
to wage-salary earnings data for married women. The earnings ﬁgures are annual
earnings in the previous year of the survey (1993 and 2003). The sample is re-
stricted to women married to male household-heads aged 25-59 years; the sample
size is 31,166 for 1994 and 24,434 for 2004. The threshold value is set at 0.9
million yen to separate I0 and T, and at 1.3 million yen to separate T and I1. This
selection is made because women who intend to limit their annual earnings are
likely to keep their earnings between 0.9 and 1.3 million yen.6 The decomposi-
tion results are reported in Table 2.
In the 2003 sample, 53 percent of the women had no wage-salary earnings,
16 percent had positive earnings below 0.9 million yen, 11 percent had earnings
around 1.03 million and the remaining 20 percent had earnings over 1.3 million.
The concentration around the threshold (the T group) is remarkable: 23 percent of
married women with positive wage-salary earnings are in this very narrow range,
for which the within-group variance (divided by ¯ y) is only 0.013 (as compared to
3On the other hand, zero earnings and threshold earnings are corner solutions in the optimiza-
tion problem for labor supply of married women.
4However, in the empirical analysis below we assume that individuals with earnings around θ
are in the T category, and as such, the variance of earnings for group T is not zero but is still very
small.
5The NSFIE has been conducted by the Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs and
Communications for every ﬁve years since 1959.
6We choose 1.3 million yen for the upper bound earnings for the T group because dependant
spouse are exempted from paying social security contributions as long as their earnings are below
1.3 million yen. This rule is explained in detail in Akabayashi (2006).
44.73 for the I1 group, which is 342 times larger). The mean is 0.92 million, which
is close to the earnings threshold θ.
In both years, the major components of CV2 are as follows: (1) the between-
group component for zero earnings (group Z, row c) that is equal to the population
share of group Z, (2) the between-group component for earnings over θ (group I1,
row c) and (3) the within-group component for group I1 (row e). The other compo-
nents are quite small as compared to these three. Of the three components above,
the largest is the between-group component for group I1, which accounts for more
than half of CV2. Therefore, the primary source of inequality in married women’s
earnings is that high earners (wives with earnings above θ; approximately 20 per-
cent of married women) earn much more than the overall average (¯ y). The second
largest source of inequality is the within-group variance for group I1, which ac-
counts for approximately 30 percent of CV2.
The notable changes between 1993 and 2003 are summarized as follows. In-
equality in the earnings of married women declined with CV2 decreasing from
3.42 in 1993 to 3.17 in 2003 (a decline of 0.25). The component that contributed
most to this decline is the fall in the between-group components: the between-
group component of the Z group fell by 0.055 and that of the I1 group fell by
0.208. The contribution of the other components is negligible. In both years, the
proportion of high earners (group I1) remained the same at approximately 20 per-
cent. On the other hand, the proportion of wives with positive earnings below 1.3
million yen increased by 6 percent and those with zero earnings decreased by 5
percent. This shift from zero earnings to low positive earnings reduces the pro-
portion of zero earnings (nZ/N), and increases the mean earnings (¯ y), which is the
main source of falling inequality over this period.
Eventhoughthe1.03millionyenceilingislikelytoconstrainearningsgrowth,
inequality nonetheless fell between 1993 and 2003. The shift from zero earnings
to low positive earnings is rational in the presence of the ceiling, and that is pre-
cisely how the earnings inequality decreased between 1993 and 2003.7 It is worth
noting that the weight of high earners fell during this period. One might have
thought that since the ceiling restrains earnings, the disparity between high earn-
ers and others would widen. However, this eﬀect was negligible. The result is
in line with Cancian & Reed (1998), who report that earnings inequality among
married women fell between 1979 and 1989 in the United States (Cancian & Reed
(1998), Table 1).8
7It is important to note that we are not making a counterfactual comparison of earnings distri-
bution in the presence and absence of the threshold.
8Reed & Cancian (2001) report that earnings inequality among all women fell continuously
54 Conclusion
This paper presents a framework for decomposing the earnings inequality for mar-
ried women in Japan that explicitly considers the concentration of earnings around
1.03 million yen, and applies it to Japanese household data.
We ﬁnd that earnings inequality of married women in Japan consists of three
major components: (1) the diﬀerence between the mean earnings of high earners
(top 20 percent) and the overall mean, (2) the large within-group variance of high
earners and (3) the proportion of wives with zero-earnings (more than 50 percent).
Earnings inequality among married women fell between 1993 and 2003, and the
decline is attributable to the increase in the number of wives with low earnings
and the decrease in the number of wives with zero earnings.
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7Table 1: Decomposition of CV2
Group Z I0 T I1
Income range yi = 0 0 < yi < θ yi = θ yi > θ
(a) Population nZ/N nI0/N nθ/N nI1/N
(b) Between 1 ( ¯ y0 − ¯ y)2/¯ y2 (θ − ¯ y)2/¯ y2 ( ¯ y1 − ¯ y)2/¯ y2
(c) Total(Between)
((a) × (b)) nZ/N (nI0/N)( ¯ y0 − ¯ y)2/¯ y2 (nθ/N)(θ − ¯ y)2/¯ y2 (nI1/N)( ¯ y1 − ¯ y)2/¯ y2
(d) Within - V(yi0)/¯ y2 - V(yi1)/¯ y2
(e) Total(Within)
((a) × (d)) - (nI0/N){V(yi0)/¯ y2} - (nI1/N){V(yi1)/¯ y2}
Note: yij (j = 0,1) represents the earnings of the i-th individual belonging to
group Ij.
8Table 2.　 Decomposition results for married women's earnings
Year
Group Z I0 T I1 Z I0 T I1
yi=0 0<yi≤09 0 9<yi≤13 yi>1 3 yi=0 0<yi≤09 0 9<yi≤13 yi>1 3
2003 1993
yi=0 0<yi≤0.9 0.9<yi≤1.3 yi>1.3 yi=0 0<yi≤0.9 0.9<yi≤1.3 yi>1.3
(a) Population 0.5887 0.1348 0.0751 0.2014 0.5341 0.1583 0.1082 0.1995
(b) Between 1 0.0831 0.0398 9.2539 1 0.1253 0.0203 8.2993
(c)Total, Between 0.5887 0.0112 0.0030 1.8635 0.5341 0.0198 0.0022 1.6555
(d) Within 0 0.0712 0.0165 4.6934 0 0.0688 0.0138 4.7302
(e) Total, Within 0 0.0096 0.0012 0.9452 0 0.0109 0.0015 0.9436
CV
2
Note: Earnings figures are in million yen.
Source: Authors' calculation from the micro data of the NSFIE (1994 and 2004).
3.4224 3.1675





Figure 1.    Earnings distribution of married women working part time, 
  by age group 
 
 
Source: Figure 2 of Abe (2009a). The sample is from the resampled data of NSFIE 
(2004). 
Note: The figures are drawn from the sample of married women working part time. 
Individuals with earnings over 3 million yen are excluded. The proportion of earnings 
over 3 million yen is less than 1.4 percent for each of the three age groups. Observations 
are weighted by the sampling weight. The number of observations are 1363 for age 
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